Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

The State of Utah v. Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
and Tonya Althoff : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brett J. Delporto; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Craig C. Halls;
attorneys for appellant.
Barton J. Warren, William L. Schultz; attorney for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rothlisberger, No. 20050269 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5688

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ITAII :;HPRF,MF,

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/App-.

j.fiulua5

Kt;v L - : n

f-miRT

'•awu Noy.

2004 0745-SC
20050269-SC
Ct. App. Nos. 20030494-CA
20030373-CA

• :, . i .::'-•; . • •

and Tonya Altnolf
Respondents/Appe]1ees

Priority

APPELLEES

JOINT BRIE*

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
\Hn-

Barton
.arrer; # 781)
261 East 300 So'^th, Suite 1 7 5
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
? {\ y
'\
i ^ ^
AttrT

TI

:sberger

« n *,b*. o )
Willian . SCUM I
69 East Center
P.O. B o x 937
M o a b , Utah 84532
A t t o r n e y for Tonya. A] thoif

Brett J. Delporto
Assistant A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
Mi ii I , I Shurtleff
U tal i A t t o r n e y General ••
160' East. 3 0 0 South, 6 th F] oor
PO B O X 140854
Salt Lake CIt j , U I" 8 41! 1! 1 C 3 5 1
Craig C. Halls
S a n Juan County A t t o r n e y
297 South M a i n Street
Monticello, Utah 84535

0P/\J. ARfJUMKNT iV\]}\\

1 ''Ilh'l

PI Ml MM Mi'V|

PKOUFfiTFn

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellant

20040745-SC
20050269-SC
Ct. App, Nos. 20030494-CA
20030373-CA
Case Nos

Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
and Tonya Althoff
Respondents/Appellees.

Priority

JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLEES

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-0O0Barton J. Warren #(7787)
261 East 300 South, Suite 175
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
William L. Schultz (#3626)
69 East Center
P.O. Box 937
Moab, Utah 84532
Attorney for Tonya Althoff
Brett J. Delporto
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
297 South Main Street
Monticello, Utah 84535

ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.

ii
1
1
2
2
6
9
11

THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION SHOULD BE UPHELD
A.

THE TESTIMONY ITSELF REQUIRED AN EXPERT
TO PRESENT I T

B.

11
11

THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY NOTIFY ROTHLISBERGER AND
ALTHOFF UNDER U T .

R.

CRIM.

P.

16

AND UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-13-3

16
19

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

A.

State

v.

Rothlisberger,

B.

1193.
State v. Althoff,
P. 3d.

2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d

2005 UT App 69, Not Reported in

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Caselaw:
Cunningham v. Gans, 507 F.2d 496 (2nd Cir. 1974)
. . . . 14
th
Farner v. Paccar, Inc.. 562 F.2d 518 (8 Cir. 1977)
. . 14
Hansen v. Evre, 2005 UT 29, 116 P.3d 290
2
Hardy v. Hardv, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989) . . . .
10,17
State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App, 1998) . . . . 11
State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, - P.3d - (Aug. 5, 2005) . 2
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)
17,18
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1998) . . 17,18
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994)
10,17
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891 (C.A.IO (Okl.) 1993) 14
United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.),
cert,
denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222
(1991)
9,12,13,16
United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332
(C.A.IO (Kan.) 1994)
9,12,16

Rules. Statutes and Constitutions:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDS. V AND XIV
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 1 7 - 1 3 ( 2 0 0 3 )
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 (3) (A)
UTAH CONSTITUTION, A R T . I § 7
U T . R. A P P . P . 45
U T . R. CRIM. P . 16
UT. R. E V I D . 7 0 1
U T . R. E V I D . 702

ii

§

1

2

7,10,11,16,18,19
1
2

1
9,11,16,17,18
2,8,12
2,7,11,12

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellant.

v.

]
]
)
)
)
)
]

Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
and Tonya Althoff,
Respondents/Appellees.

]
]i
)

CaseNos.

20040745-SC
20050269-SC
Ct. App. Nos.
20030494-CA
20030373-CA

Priority

JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §§78-2-2(3)(a), and UT. R. APP. P. 45.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I:

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that Monticello Police
Chief Kent Adair testified as an expert when he stated that
methamphetamine users generally possess only a quarter- to half gram
and do not possess scales or baggiesy which are generally used by drug
distributors for repackaging and selling or larger drug quantities?

Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness and examines the Court of

Appeals' decision to determine whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review. See, State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, ^[4,
— P.3d — (August 5,2005); Hansen v. Evre. 2005 UT 29, f8,116 P.3d 290.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Art. I § 7
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,

Amends. V and XIV § 1

UTR.EVID. 701
UT. R. EVID. 702

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 24,2002, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger ("Rothlisberger") and Tonya
Althoff ("Althoff') were traveling in a car driven by Althoff returning to Moab, Utah, from
a road trip they had been on to Arizona (Tr.1 at p. 50). Officer Jim Eberling ("Eberling")
effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle for improper lane travel, then released Althoff. Id. at
p. 72. Upon returning to his vehicle, Eberling was informed by dispatch that the plates on
Althoff s vehicle were expired. Id. at p. 51. Eberling effectuated a second stop approximately
1 V2 blocksfromthe first. Id. at pp. 52, 72.
After requesting Althoff s license and registration, Eberling was informed that her
driver's license was suspended (Tr. at pp. 52-53,72,139). He placed Althoff under arrest and
1

The transcripts in Althoff and Rothlisbergers' cases are identical and each record
contains a copy; although the transcripts are not paginated in the record index for Rothlisberger's
case. Therefore, the citations contained herein to the transcripts pertain to the Althoff record at
141.
2

conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest. Id. Eberling located a small baggy
of a white substance on the console between the two front seats. Id. at pp. 53, 64, 73, 98.
Chief Kent Adair ("Adair") arrived to assist and Eberling placed Rothlisberger under arrest
for possession of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 54-55, 80, 83.
The vehicle was moved to an abandoned service station, where the two officers
continued searching the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 55, 74, 76-77, 80, 83-84). Adair located a large
bag of methamphetamine in a toilet paper roll in the passenger door, and a snort bottlecontaining only residue of methamphetamine-in a pair of men's pants that was located in the
passenger door panel. Id at pp. 56-58,60, 64, 74, 84-86, 93, 97-99,100-101; Exhibits 1, 5,
6 and 9. Rothlisberger claimed the pants and the snort bottle as his. Id. at p. 87. Althoff
claimed the methamphetamine as hers and stated that Rothlisberger knew nothing about it.
Id. at pp. 61, 69, 71, 95. Eberling found a gym bag in the back seat, which Althoff claimed
as hers and which contained a wooden box. Id. at pp. 59, 62-63, 69, 71. The wooden box
contained scales, which had white residue on them, and several baggies. Id. at 59; Exhibits
7 and 8.
On September 26, 2002, Rothlisberger and Althoff were charged by Information
regarding the incident. Rothlisberger was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance
With Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
Class B Misdemeanor (Rothlisberger R0001-R0002). Althoff was simultaneously charged,
but those charges were later amended on December 13, 2002, to include Possession of a
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Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; Driving With
Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, a class B misdemeanor; Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License,
a class B misdemeanor; and Failure by New Owner to Secure New Registration and New
Certificate of Title, a class C misdemeanor (Althoff R0001-R0004; R0025-R0027).
On February 11,2003, Rothlisberger and Althoff were found guilty on all charges (Tr.
at pp. 173-174). On May 5,2003, Rothlisberger appeared for sentencing before the trial court
and was sentenced to a term of one (1) tofifteen(15) years on the felony, and six (6) months
on the misdemeanor (Rothlisberger RO 115-R0117). On May 21,2003, the trial court entered
its Judgment and Order ofProbation (the "Rothlisberger Judgment"). Id. On June 6,2003,
Rothlisberger timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Rothlisberger Judgment
(Rothlisberger R0118-R0119).
On April 7, 2003, Althoff appeared for sentencing before the trial court and was
sentenced to a term of one (1) tofifteen(15) years on the felony charge, six (6) months each
in the San Juan County Jail on the class B misdemeanor charges, and ninety (90) days in the
San Juan County Jail on the class C misdemeanor charge, all to be served concurrently
(Althoff R0129-R0130). On April 8,2003, the trial court entered its Judgment and Order of
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Althoff Judgment"). Id. On April 25,2003, Althoff
timely filed her Notice ofAppeal from the Althoff Judgment (Althoff P.0136-R0137).

4

After briefing and oral argument, on July 1,2004, the Utah Court of Appeals entered
its Opinion reversing Rothlisberger's conviction of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and remanded the matter for a new trial (the "Rothlisberger Opinion").
See, Addendum "A." On or about September 1,2004, the State of Utah filed its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals [sic] (the "Rothlisberger Petition") alleging
that the Utah Court of Appeals had decided an important question of state law which has not
been, but should be settled by this Court.
On November 24,2004, this Court granted the Rothlisberger Petition and set the matter
for briefing. On February 17,2005, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed Althoff s conviction
on the same issue as in the Rothlisberger Opinion. See, Addendum "B." On March 3,2005,
the State filed its opening brief with this Court in the appeal pertaining to the Rothlisberger
Petition. On March 21,2005, the State filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the "Althoff
Petition") with this Court in the Althoff case, challenging the Utah Court ofAppeals' opinion
on the same issue as in the Rothlisberger Petition.
On May 4, 2005, the State filed its motion to consolidate the Althoff Petition and
Rothlisberger Petition. On May 5, 2005, Rothlisberger filed his motion to stay the briefing
pending determination of the motion to consolidate. On June 1,2005, this Court granted the
Althoff Petition. On June 6, 2005, this Court granted the State's motion to consolidate and
Rothlisberger's motion to stay pending a briefing schedule in Althoff. In its June 6, 2005,

5

Order, this Court determined that Rothlisberger and Althoff s appellee's briefs would be filed
simultaneously in this matter.
Rothlisberger and Althoff have filed a separate motion with this Court to allow them
to file this joint brief in this matter rather than separate appellee's briefs based on the fact that
the issue on appeal in each of their cases is identical, as are the facts of the case as they pertain
to the issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 2,2002, Althoff and Rothlisberger appeared before the Seventh Judicial
District Court, for their preliminary hearing (Rothlisberger R0214). At the preliminary
hearing, Eberling testified that he believed the quantity of drugs found in the door panel2,
when taken with the scale and baggies found in Althoff s gym bag, were likely intended for
distribution. Id. at pp. 18-19. Although Adair also testified at the preliminary hearing
regarding his participation in the arrest, he did not offer any testimony regarding the
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine found in the door panel. Id. at pp. 37-44.

2

The Utah Court of Appeals mistakenly indicates throughout the Opinion that the large
quantity of drugs was found in Respondent's pants; however, the transcripts of the hearing and
testimony elicited thereat clearly show that the large quantity of drugs wasfoundin a toilet paper
roll in the passenger side door panel. There was some confusion since Respondent's pants were
also in the door panel; however, Respondent's pants were removed from the door panel by Adair
when the vehicle was being moved to the abandoned service station. See, Transcripts at p. 97.
After Eberling's extensive search of the vehicle at the abandoned service station, Adair
approached and assisted him and only then located the toilet paper roll in the door panel Id. at
p. 56, 65, 74, 85, 98-99; Trial Exhibit " 1 " at p. 2, and Exhibits "5" and "6."
6

At trial, however, the prosecutor did not elicit Eberling's opinion regarding the
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine found in the door panel. Instead, questions
regarding the significance of the quantity were now directed toward Adair (Tr. at at p. 90-92).
The following colloquies occurred during Adair's direct examination:
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in your experience to look or see how
methamphetamine is usually packaged as far as—when you have found
methamphetamine in your experience, have you found times when people have
had personal use amounts?
A: Yes.
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity?
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe even at the most a gram.
Q: Do you have-through your training and experience, do you know commonly
what somebody would buy if they were to go out on the street buy some right
now, what would they usually get for personal use?
A: I don't understand the question. What do you mean what would they usually
get?
Q: Well, if IA: Are you talking the quantity?
Q: Yes.
A: In our undercover investigations when we buy from individuals, we usually
buy a quarter or a half a gram.
Q: Have you ever found in your experience that someone who had personal
quantities of methamphetamine to have scales?
A: It's not common, no.
Rothlisberger's trial attorney objected to Adair's testimony, arguing that it should be
deemed expert testimony under UT. R. EVID. 702 and, accordingly, that admission of that
expert testimony was improper because the State had not given the defense thirty-days' notice
of the expert testimony as required by as required by UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 (2003).
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Althoff s trial attorney joined in the objection. The trial court overruled the objection, ruling
that Chief Adair's testimony was admissible as lay witness testimony under UT. R. EVID. 701.
On June 16,2003, Rothlisberger filed his Motionfor Certificate of Probable Cause and
Memorandum in Support (the "First Motion") in the Seventh Judicial District Court. On July
3, 2003, Honorable Lyle R. Anderson denied the First Motion.

On July 14, 2003,

Rothlisberger filed his Motion to Set Aside Order, Renew Motion for Certificate of Probable
Cause, and Strike Hearing (the "Second Motion"). On July 29, 2003, Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson entered the court's Ruling on Renewed Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause,
denying the Second Motion, indicating that the trial court believed the testimony "...to be
neither expert testimony nor lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual
experiences." Rothlisberger R0212.
After consideration of the parties briefs and oral arguments, the Utah Court of Appeals
held that (1) Adair's trial testimony regarding the significance of amount of methamphetamine
found was expert testimony; (2) Respondent did not waive his right to challenge the admission
of expert testimony by failing to request a continuance; and (3) the State failed to provide
proper notice to defendant of testimony of officer who was expert witness. See, Addendum
"A." Based upon these findings, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed Rothlisberger's
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and remanded the
matter for a new trial.

8

Several months later, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision in the Althoff
case stating that "Althoff s arrest, conviction, and appeal mirror those of her companion at the
time of her arrest, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger." See, Addendum "B." It found that Althoff
presented identical issues central to the decision in the Rothlisberger Opinion and reversed
Althoff s convictions and remanded her case for a new trial on that basis. Id
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that evidence on the
significance of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not within the purview of a
typical juror's knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to provide the jurors with
the knowledge necessary to the understanding. U.S.v.Muldrow, 19F.3d 1332,1338(C.A.10
(Kan.),1994) citing United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 502
U.S. 897,112 S.Ct. 270,116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person possessing no knowledge of the
drug world would find the importance of [the amount possessed] impossible to
understand...[t]he average juror would not know whether this quantity is a mere trace, or
sufficient to pollute 1,000 people.").
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

16(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall

disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense." UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(g) establishes the
following:

9

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by
deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal
testimony. See. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense);
Hardy v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because
not timely provided to opposing party).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-17-13, in relevant part, states as follows:

(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending
to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable
but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing,
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing party on reasonable notice.
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent
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substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
Upon a finding that a party failed to comply with the thirty day notice requirement of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§77-17-13(l)(a), subsection 4(a) requires the trial court to grant a continuance

sufficient to prepare and meet the testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah
App. 1998).
The trial court erred by first not recognizing Adair as an expert, then by allowing Adair
to testify as to the significance of the amount of drugs possessed and the uses of the drug
paraphernalia found in the vehicle. This was in violation of both UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 since Adair's testimony regarding these

matters was never disclosed by the State and Adair was never designated as an expert witness.
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the law to the facts of the cases and its
determination should stand.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
SHOULD BE UPHELD
A.

THE TESTIMONY ITSELF REQUIRED AN EXPERT TO PRESENT IT,

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

702, sets forth that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise"(emphasis added). The
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United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that evidence on the significance
of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not within the purview of a typical juror's
knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to provide the jurors with the knowledge
necessary to the understanding. U.S. v. Muldrow. 19F.3d 1332,1338 (C.A. 10 (Kan.), 1994)
citing United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897,112
S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person possessing no knowledge of the drug world
would find the importance of [the amount possessed] impossible to understand... [t]he average
juror would not know whether this quantity is a mere trace, or sufficient to pollute 1,000
people.99).
In United States v. McDonald, the trial court never formally accepted the police officer
as an expert witness, but the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals assumed the witness was accepted
as an expert witness by the trial court since the trial court heard the witness describe his
qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skills and experience, and then
allowed the witness to give opinion testimony. McDonald at 1522, fn. 2; see also UTAHRULES
OF EVIDENCE 702. At trial, the trial court in the instant matter never formally accepted Adair
as an expert witness with respect to methamphetamine distribution and paraphernalia, stating
only that he was testifying as a lay witness pursuant to Rule 701 of the UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE (Tr. at p.

105). In the trial court's ruling on the Second Motion, however, the trial

court acknowledged that it had accepted Adair as a lay witness at the trial but that, upon
review for the Second Motion, determined that the testimony was "...neither expert testimony
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or [sic] lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual experience"
(R0211-R0213; emphasis added).
Adair's testimony was not the type of attestation a lay person could render. See,
McDonald. The prosecutor even premised some of his questions by asking Adair to render
an opinion "...through [his] training and experience..." as to what the typical distributional
amount of methamphetamine was on the street and the uses of certain drug paraphernalia (Tr.
at pp. 91-92; emphasis added). Additionally, the trial court had heard Adair describe his
qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skill and experience with
respect to drug distribution and paraphernalia (Tr. at pp. 81 -83). Specifically, Adair testified
as follows:
BY MR. HALLS:
Q.
State your name and occupation.
A.
My name is Kent Adair, and I'm a police officer for Monticello City.
Q.
How long have you been a police officer?
A.
Twenty years.
Q.
What kind of training did you have before you became a police officer?
A.
I went to the police academy.
Q.
Have you taken or had some training in drug intervention, (inaudible) drugs,
that kind of thing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Has it required that you keep up some kind of a certification by taking seminars
on a yearly basis?
A.
We have to have 40 hours annual training.
Q.
Have you done that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that for the last 20 years?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How many drug cases do you think you have worked in that 20 years?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
So13

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Myself or been involved in?
Okay, let's go with been involved in. Give me [sic] estimate, if you can.
I don't know, I'd say a hundred, probably.
Do you supervise anyone in your department that works with the Grand San
Juan County Drug Task Force?
Yes.
Have you been involved in cases that involve methamphetamine?
Yes.
Are you familiar or do you know from your training and experience—well, I'm
going to wait a few minutes to ask you that...

Id. Based on this information concerning Adair's specialized knowledge, education, skills
and experience, the trial court allowed Adair to testify as to the significance of the amount
possessed, hence it is assumed Adair was accepted as an expert witness by the trial court.
McDonald at 1522, fn. 2.
In U.S.v.Markum. the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[experience alone can
qualify a witness to give expert testimony." 4 F.3d 891 (C.A.10 (Okl.)1993); see, Farner v.
Paccar. Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528-529 (8th Cir. 1977); Cunningham v. Gains. 507 F.2d 496, 500
(2nd Cir. 1974). In the instant matter, Adair was cross-examined extensively regarding his
experience directly before he gave the testimony at issue. It is axiomatic that the prosecution
elicited this "experience" testimony for the purpose of informing the jury as to Adair's
expertise in the field so the jury could determine the reliability of his testimony.
The State attempts to sidestep the requirements of expert notification by arguing that
a police officer's experience is not within a realm of expertise. This position was that of the
trial court, as stated in the Second Motion, that it did not believe it was expert or lay opinion
testimony, but testimony based on Adair's experience. Experience, however, is the basis for
14

determining whether someone is an expert in their field. When coupled with the expert nature
of the testimony at issue here, as argued further below, it is clear that the State intended Adair
to offer testimony not within the purview of the typical juror's knowledge and is simply trying
to sidestep the notification requirements.
The trial court would not have allowed just anyone to offer this type of testimony
without any foundation as to their experience. As evidenced by the trial court's ruling on the
Second Motion, the trial court only allowed Adair to testify because ofhis experience. It did
not have to be Chief Adair who gave the testimony. Anyone who could lay proper foundation
for their knowledge gained through their experience could have testified as to this matter, but
only after that experience showed that they could be an "expert" in the field and proper
notification had been given to the opposing party. It is axiomatic that a trial court would not
allow any person off the streets to offer this type of testimony because it is not within the
purview of the average person's knowledge.
The State focuses its argument completely on the idea that Adair testified simply based
on his experience and was thus not an expert, but they fail to argue anything pertaining to
whether the testimony specifically at issue herein itself requires an expert to give it. Each of
the cases cited to by the State from various jurisdictions in its briefpertains to testimony other
than the significance of the amount of drugs possessed and are thus distinguishable since this
issue pertains specifically to this testimony. See, State's Althoff Brief at pp. 21-29; State's
Rothlisberger brief at pp. 22-30. It is the testimony itself in this matter that is considered to
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be "expert." As argued supra, our own 10th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically stated, and
has long upheld, that the testimony respecting the significance of the quantity possessed
requires an expert to give it. U.S. v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332, 1338 (C.A.10 (Kan.),1994)
citim United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897,112
S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991).
Testimony regarding the significance of the drug possessed requires an expert to
present it. Only after a determination as to whether the testimony requires an expert do we
turn to whether the witness offering such testimony qualifies as an expert and whether the
requirements under UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 have been met. In
the instant matter, however, the trial court erroneously found that the testimony did not require
an expert and thus found that the requirements need not be met, violating Rothlisberger and
Althoff s rights under UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, as argued further
below. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this err and correctly reversed and remanded
the Althoff and Rothlisberger's cases.
B.

THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY NOTIFY ROTHLISBERGER AND ALTHOFF
UNDER UT. R. CRIM.

P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

16(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall

disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense." UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(g) establishes the
following:
16

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by
deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal
testimony. See. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense);
Hardy v. Hardv. 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because
not timely provided to opposing party).
Where evidence is inculpatory, the prosecutor's discovery duty is limited to disclosures
under Rule 16 of the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. State v. Rugebreet 965 P.2d
518, 522 (Utah App. 1998). Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence under court
order or upon request, they have a duty to comply fully and forthrightly. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that, when the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure of
inculpatory evidence to a defendant, the prosecution must produce all the requested material
or identify those portions not disclosed. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913,916-17 (Utah 1987).
In cases involving wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, the State has the burden
of persuading the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice Appellant and there was no
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reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial v/ould have been more
favorable for Appellant. Id. at 921.
At the trial in this matter, Appellant's trial counsel objected to Adair's testimony with
respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia (RO104-RO108). As established supra,
Adair testified as an expert with respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia;
however, his expert testimony was not disclosed by the prosecution prior to the trial in this
matter. Adair's testimony was inculpatory and, therefore, the prosecutor had a duty to
disclose it fully and forthrightly to the defense under Rule 16. State v. Rugebregt. 965 P.2d
518, 522 (Utah App. 1998).
The State voluntarily disclosed to the defense that Adair would be called as a witness,
designating him only as "Law Enforcement, assisting officer" on the witness list
(Rothlisberger R0028); however, the State failed to produce all of the evidence when it failed
to disclose that Adair would be testifying as an expert in drug distribution and paraphernalia.
See. Knight at 916-17.
Under objection from the defense and in violation of
PROCEDURE

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL

16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, Adair testified as an undisclosed expert to

the amount of methamphetamine considered to be a single dose and the uses of the drug
paraphernalia found in the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 86-87, 90-92). The State's failure to disclose
Adair's expert testimony to the defense prior to the trial in this matter denied Appellant the
ability to plan for an effective cross-examination and obtain rebuttal testimony with respect
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to Adair. The failure to disclose Adair's testimony as to the amount of methamphetamine per
dose and the uses of the drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle was clearly a violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-17-13. Given the fact that the State was charging Rothlisberger and

Althoff with intent to distribute and Adair's expert testimony went directly towards that end,
the State's violation of §77-17-13 was prejudicial to Rothlisberger and Althoff.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellees respectfully requests that this
Court enter an order denying the State's Petition.
DATED this

day of

, 2005.

Barton J. Warren
Counsel for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger

William L. Schultz
Counsel for Tonya Althoff

19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of
, 2005,1 mailed,firstclass postage
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to:
Brett J. Delporto
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
297 South Main Street
Monticello, Utah 84535

20

Addendum ~A~
State

v. Rothlisberger,
2004 UT App
226, 95 P.3d 1193

ra^c ^ui u

Vfe£km
95P.3dll93

Page 1

95 P.3d 1193, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,2004 UT App 226
(Cite as: 95 P.3d 1193,2004 UT App 226)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas Kevin ROTHLISBERGER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20030494-CA.
July 1,2004.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
Seventh District Court, Monticello Department,
Lyle R. Anderson, J., of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that:
(1) officer's testimony regarding significance of
amount of methamphetamine found was expert
testimony;
(2) defendant did not waive his right to challenge
admission of expert testimony by failing to request
continuance; and
(3) State failed to provide proper notice to
defendant of testimony of office who was expert
witness.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, P.J., dissented.

technical, or other specialized knowledge. Rules of
Evid., Rule 702; U.C.A.1953, 77-17-13(l)(a).
[2] Criminal Law €==>478(1)
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases
When a witness seeks to testify regarding matters
that are necessarily based on that witness's
"scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge,"
that witness must be qualified as an expert under
rule governing testimony of experts, and all
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable
statutory commands must then be followed with
respect to that testimony. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.
[3] Criminal Law €^478(1)
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases
Witnesses can be qualified as experts not only on
the basis of formal educational training, but also on
the basis of their own personal or vocational
experiences. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.
[4] Criminal Law €=>474.5
110k474.5 Most Cited Cases
[4] Criminal Law €=^478(1)
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases
Knowledge regarding the significance of a
particular quantity of drug is beyond the realm of
common experience for the common juror, and is
accordingly the type of testimony that a witness
could offer only if first qualified as an expert.
Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=>629(11)
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases
Police officer's testimony that amount of
methamphetamine found was significant in that it
was likely that large amount was intended for
further sale was expert testimony in possession with
intent to distribute prosecution, requiring State to
give defendant 30 days notice of testimony;
testimony was necessarily based on scientific,

[5] Criminal Law €==>1030(1)
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases
Parties are not required to make futile objections in
order to preserve a future claim.
[6] Criminal Law €==>1036.6
110kl036.6 Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not waive his right to challenge
admission of expert testimony by failing to request
continuance, where trial court first erred by
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concluding that challenged testimony was
admissible as lay witness testimony, making any
objection based on expert testimony rules futile.
Rules ofEvid., Rule 702.
[7] Criminal Law €==>629(11)
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases
A party who is seeking to offer expert testimony
must first provide the other party with a copy of the
expeifs name, address, and curriculum vitae; this
clearly contemplates that the opposing party will
have the opportunity to prepare for that expert's
testimony
in a witness-specific
fashion.
U.C.A.1953,77-17-13(l)(b).
[8] Criminal Law €=^629(11)
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases
State failed to provide proper notice to defendant of
testimony of police officer who was expert witness;
although another officer offered testimony that was
similar in content, officer did not testify as expert at
preliminary hearing, and State did not provide
defense with copy of officer's name, address, and
curriculum vitae. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-13(5)(a).
*1194 Barton J. Warren, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Brett J. Delporto
, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
**1 Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger was convicted
of one count of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute and one count of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Rothlisberger
now argues that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of Monticello Police Chief Kent Adair
(Chief Adair) as lay witness testimony, and that the
State therefore erred by failing to provide thirty
days notice of that testimony as required by Utah
Code Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). We
affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND
**2 On September 24, 2002, Tonya Althoff and
Rothlisberger were pulled over while returning to
Utah after a brief trip to Arizona. Officer Jim
Eberling (Officer Eberling) initially pulled the pahover after observing an improper lane change. At
the time of the stop, Althoff was driving the car and
Rothlisberger was sitting in the front passenger
seat. A subsequent search of police records by
Officer Eberling revealed that the license plates on
the car had expired and that Althoff s driver license
had been suspended. Because of this, Althoff was
removedfromthe vehicle and placed under arrest.
**3 After Althoff had been handcuffed and placed
in Officer Eberling's car, Officer Eberling
conducted a search of the vehicle. During this
search, Officer Eberling discovered a small plastic
bag containing methamphetamine that was located
in plain view on the console between the two front
seats. Sometime during this initial phase of the
*1195 search, Chief Adair arrived on the scene.
Due to the discovery of the small plastic bag
containing methamphetamine on the front console,
the officers placed Rothlisberger under arrest and
continued with their search of the car. During this
search, Chief Adair noticed that Rothlisberger had
acted very nervous while Officer Eberling was
searching in the area of the front passenger seat.
Based on Rothlisberger's behavior, Chief Adair
instructed Officer Eberling to focus on the
passenger side of the car. Further search led to the
discovery of a pair of men's pants that had been
stuffed into the passenger's side door panel. Inside
of the pants was a small plastic bag, placed inside of
a toilet paper roll, that contained what was later
shown to be thirty-two grams of methamphetamine.
The officers also found a snort tube with the pair of
pants. The snort tube was covered with a white
residue
that
was
later
identified
as
methamphetamine. During the further search of the
vehicle, the officers also found a gym bag in the
trunk that contained drug scales, covered in white
residue, and several small plastic bags.
**4 After being given the Miranda warnings,
Rothlisberger admitted to officers that the pants
found stuffed in the passenger side door were his.
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Rothlisberger also admitted that the snort tube was
his. Rothlisberger further admitted to having used
methamphetamine before leaving Arizona earlier
that morning. After being given the Miranda
warnings, Althoff claimed that the gym bag found in
the trunk was hers. She also claimed that the
methamphetamine found in the car was hers, and
that Rothlisberger had no knowledge of it.

found methamphetamine in your experience, have
you found times when people have had personal
use amounts?
A: Yes.
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is the
quantity?
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe
even at the most a gram.

**5 On September 26, 2002, Rothlisberger was
charged with one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (2003), and one count of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated section 58-37a-5(l) (2003).
[FN1] On December 2, 2002, Rothlisberger
appeared before the district court for his
preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing,
Officer Eberling testified regarding the significance
of the quantity of drugs found in Rothlisberger's
pair of pants. Officer Eberling specifically testified
that the drugs found in the pants were of such large
quantity that it was likely that the drugs were
intended for further sale. Though Chief Adair also
testified at the preliminary hearing regarding his
participation in the arrest, he did not offer any
testimony at the preliminary hearing regarding the
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine
found in Rothlisberger's pants.

Q: Do you have-through your training and
experience, do you know commonly what
somebody would buy if they were to go out on
the street buy some right now, what would they
usually get for personal use?
A: I don't understand the question. What do you
mean what would they usually get?
Q: Well, if I A: Are you talking the quantity?
Q: Yes.
*1196 A: In our undercover investigations when
we buy from individuals, we usually buy a quarter
or a half a gram.

FN1. Althoff was also charged with
various criminal counts arising out of this
same incident. Her subsequent trial and
convictions, however, are not before us as
part of this appeal.
**6 At trial, however, the prosecutor did not ask
Officer Eberling to offer his opinion regarding the
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine
found in Rothlisberger's pants. Instead, questions
regarding the significance of the quantity were now
directed toward Chief Adair. The following
colloquies occurred during Chief Adair's direct
examination:
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in your
experience to look or see how methamphetamine
is usually packaged as far as~when you have
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

Q: Have you ever found in your experience that
someone who had personal quantities of
methamphetamine to have scales?
A: It's not common, no.
**7 Defense attorneys objected to Chief Adair's
testimony, arguing that it should be deemed expert
testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and accordingly that admission of that
expert testimony was improper because the State
had not given the defense thirty-days notice of the
expert testimony as required by Utah Code
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). The trial court
overruled this objection, ruling that Chief Adair's
testimony was admissible as lay witness testimony
under rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
**8 On February 11, 2003, Rothlisberger was
found guilty on both counts. He now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
**9 Rothlisberger argues that the trial court erred
in admitting Chief Adair's testimony regarding the
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine
found in Rothlisberger's pants. We review
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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decisions relating to the qualification of a witness as
an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of
discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 925
(UtahCt.App.1989). [FN2]
FN2. Rothlisberger also argues that the
State's pretrial failure to notify him of
Chief Adair's potential testimony violated
rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Because we hold that reversal
is warranted due to the State's failure to
comply with Utah Code Annotated section
77-17-13 (2003), we need not reach the
merits of this separate claim.
ANALYSIS
[1] **10 Under Utah Code Annotated section
77-17-13(l)(a) (2003), "[i]f the prosecution or the
defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial ... the party intending to call the
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as
soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before
trial." Rothlisberger argues that Chief Adair's
testimony regarding the significance of the amount
of methamphetamine found with his pants was
expert testimony, and that the State's failure to give
him thirty-days notice of that testimony warrants
reversal. We agree.
**11 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, lay
witness testimony is defined as testimony that is
"rationally based on the perception of the witness,"
Utah R. Evid. 701, while expert testimony is
testimony that is based on "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge." Utah R. Evid. 702.
There have been multiple Utah cases that have
discussed the question of whether a witness may be
classified as an expert for the purposes of testifying
about a particular subject. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand
Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,1 25, 84
P.3d 1154; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115,1
1 52-86, 61 P.3d 1068. The question before us
today, however, is not whether the State could have
offered expert testimony regarding this subject, but
rather whether that subject is so specialized that the
State must first qualify its witness as an expert
before the trial court can properly admit testimonial
opinion regarding it.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI

**12 The State contends that this subject was
resolved by the opinion of our supreme court in
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). In Ellis,
one of the issues before the court was whether a lay
witness could be allowed to offer his opinion that
two separate footprints that were found at the scene
of a crime came from the same shoe. See id. at 190.
In ruling that such testimony was admissible as lay
witness testimony, our supreme court held that
[s]imply because a question might be capable of
scientific determination, helpful lay testimony
touching on the issue and based on personal
observation does not become expert opinion. It is
true that "if [a question] is capable of scientific
determination,
then
expert
testimony
is
admissible with respect to it"; however, that does
not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited
if the provisions of the evidentiary rule are met.
*1197 Id. at 191 (citation omitted) (alterations in
original).
**13 Contrary to the State's assertions, we do not
think that Ellis is directly controlling here. In
affirming the trial court's conclusion that the
challenged testimony was lay testimony, the Ellis
court simply concluded that though the subject of
footprint comparison might be a subject about
which experts could testify, the challenged
testimony itself did not automatically meet the
definitional standards for expert testimony. Left
unresolved in Ellis, however, was the question of
whether there are certain other subjects that should
be considered so intrinsically specialized that a
witness could not testify regarding them without
relying on the types of "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge" that are characteristic
of expert testimony under rule 702. [FN3]
FN3. It is worth noting that under Ellis's
express terms the State would not have
been prevented from calling an expert
witness in footprint identification to further
bolster its case before the jury, nor would
the State have been prevented from
attempting to bolster that very witness's
own credibility by attempting to qualify
him as an expert in footprint identification
or forensic investigation.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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**14 To date, there has been no Utah decision that
has directly addressed the question of whether a
witness must be characterized as an expert in order
to testify about a particular subject. In
circumstances in which Utah courts have not
definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate for
us to turn to decisions and commentators that
interpret the related federal rules for guidance. See
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120,f 33 n. 5, 63 P.3d 72
**15 Our review of the related federal cases
indicates that the question of whether a person must
be designated as an expert to testify regarding a
particular subject is one that has been the subject of
much disagreement among the federal courts. Some
courts have taken a narrow interpretive approach to
this question, holding that a witness whose
testimony could be admitted as expert testimony
under rule 702 must be admitted as an expert in
order to testify regarding that subject. In Randolph
v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844 (10th
Cir.1979), for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a
lay witness is not permitted to "express an opinion
as to matters which are beyond the realm of
common experience and which require the special
skill and knowledge of an expert witness." Id. at
846. This bright line rule was similarly emphasized
by the Fourth Circuit in Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200 (4th
Cir.2000), wherein the court held that rule 701 does
not permit lay witnesses to testify about matters that
are necessarily predicated on "some specialized
knowledge or skill or education that is not in the
possession of the jurors." Id. at 203 (quotations and
citation omitted). In this manner, courts that have
adopted this narrow interpretive approach have
essentially concluded that the definitional boundary
separating rule 701 lay testimony from rule 702
expert testimony should be carefiilly observed. In
essence, courts following this approach hold that
while lay witnesses are allowed to testify regarding
their direct perceptions of the events in question,
opinions or inferences that are reliant on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge" are
necessarily excluded unless the witness is first
qualified as an expert.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

**16 Other federal courts have favored a more
liberal interpretive approach to the question at hand.
The Fifth Circuit, for example, has clearly held that
lay witness testimony may include opinions that are
predicated on "specialized knowledge," as long as
that testimony is rationally based on the "personal
perception" of the witness. United States v. Riddle,
103 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir.1997). Thus, in Soden
v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1983),
the court held that a mechanic was allowed to testify
as a lay witness regarding his conclusion that a
particular design defect was not only dangerous, but
also the likely cause of a series of accidents. See id.
at 510-12. In holding that the testimony was
admissible as lay witness testimony, the court
emphasized that the mechanic's testimony was
based on his own personal observations of the
involved trucks, see id. at 511-12, and that the
opinions that he offered were "rationally" related
*1198 to those personal observations. Id. at 512.
The court thus emphasized that though the witness's
testimony "did constitute an opinion which might
have better been given by one more formally an
expert," its "strong basis both in his observation and
in his experience" rendered it a subject about which
lay testimony could appropriately be offered. Id.
**17 Various other federal courts have followed
this more liberal interpretive approach. For
example, the Eighth Circuit held that "four
executives of railroads" were allowed to testify
"that, in their experience, trains with cabooses were
no safer than cabooseless trains." Burlington N.
RR. Co. v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994, 1004 (8th
Cir.1986). According to the Burlington N. RR. Co.
court,
this
testimony
was
appropriately
characterized as lay witness testimony because it
was based on the executives' own "personal
experiences." Id. Similar results were reached in
such cases as United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d
1131, 1145 (7th Cir.1982), and United States v.
VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995).
**18 The more liberal interpretive approach has,
however, been the subject of some criticism. One
respected commentator has written that "many
courts expanded the admissibility of lay opinion and
inference testimony beyond Rule 701's primary
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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purpose, thereby permitting lay opinion testimony
to encroach on Rule 702's province." 4 Joseph M.
McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence §
701.03 [4] [b] (2d ed.2004). This same commentator
further wrote that "[i]n some instances, it has been
difficult to discern from the court's opinions why
the admissible 'lay opinion testimony' was not, in
fact, 'expert opinion testimony.' " Id. Certain federal
courts have been similarly critical of the liberal
approach. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has
recently noted that the liberal approach would
potentially allow parties to evade the strictures of
the expert qualification process by simply
characterizing their expert witnesses as lay
witnesses. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair
Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1222
(llthCir.2003).
**19 These concerns appear to have been shared
by the drafters of the federal rules. Indeed, the
2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence appears to have been expressly drafted for
the purpose of closing this erstwhile loophole.
Before the amendment, rules 701 and 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence were silent on the issue
of whether lay witnesses were allowed to offer
opinions on certain subjects that would normally
require specialized knowledge. The 2000
amendment to rule 701 changed this, however, with
the rule now expressly declaring that lay witnesses
are not allowed to offer testimony that is "based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702." Explaining the
purpose of this amendment, the advisory committee
notes to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
expressly state that "[r]ule 701 has been amended to
eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements
set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the
simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay
witness clothing." The advisory committee notes
further state that
[t]he amendment does not distinguish between
expert and lay witnesses, but rather between
expert and lay testimony. Certainly it is possible
for the same witness to provide both lay and
expert testimony in a single case. The
amendment makes clear that any part of a
witnesses] testimony that is based upon scientific
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI

technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702 is governed by the
standards of Rule 702 and the corresponding
disclosure requirements of the Civil and Criminal
Rules.
Id. (emphasis added).
[2] **20 After considering the different
approaches to this question, we are persuaded that
the narrow interpretive approach embodied by the
2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is the correct approach to follow in
interpreting our own rules of evidence. When
confronted with questions of rule-based or statutory
interpretation, we endeavor to interpret the rules
and statutes in such a manner so as to give full
meaning and effect to all of the involved provisions.
Here, adopting the open-ended approach discussed
above would not only blur the distinction between
rules 701 and *1199 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, but would also create the very real danger
that parties might impermissibly seek to avoid the
reliability and reporting requirements required
under our law by merely engaging in games of
semantics. To avoid opening the door for such
results, we think it clear that when a witness seeks
to testify regarding matters that are necessarily
based on that witness's "scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge," that witness must be
qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, and all reliability, reporting, or
otherwise applicable statutory commands must then
be followed with respect to that testimony. [FN4]
FN4. In State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350
(Utah 1996), our supreme court noted that
"when a new rule ... constitutes a clear
break with the past, it is not generally
applied retroactively." Id. at 354. This is
particularly so where a retroactive
application would impair our efforts to
"maintain[ ] the efficient administration of
justice." Id.
We recognize here that our interpretation
of rules 701 and 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence settles a question for which there
had been little prior guidance from Utah
appellate courts. We further recognize that
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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this issue is likely the subject of some
dispute in many cases that are currently
before our various courts. In order to
maintain the efficient administration of
justice, we accordingly hold that today's
opinion
should
only
be applied
prospectively, and that any decisions
relating to this question that were entered
prior to today's holding should not be
reversed thereby.
**21 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States
v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.1997),
is instructive. In Figueroa-Lopez, the defendant
was charged with various counts relating to an
illegal drug transaction. See id at 1242. At trial,
various federal agents who were involved in the
surveillance of the defendant testified regarding the
events leading up to the arrest. See id. One agent,
testifying as a lay witness, asserted that the
defendant had engaged in "countersurveillance"
activities that were "common practice for narcotics
dealers" and that the defendant's use of a rental car
was also "a common practice for narcotics dealers."
Id at 1243. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overruled
the trial court's conclusions that the testimony was
properly admissible as lay witness testimony. See
id. at 1246. In so ruling, the appellate court found
that the testimony was necessarily predicated on
"demonstrable expertise" in the area of law
enforcement, id, and that the subjects about which
the agent testified were therefore not "common
enough" to be the subject of lay witness testimony.
Id at 1245. Responding to the government's
argument that the testimony was admissible as lay
witness testimony due to its reliance on the agent's
own personal observations, the court noted that the
government's argument would "simply blur[ ] the
distinction between Federal Rules of Evidence 701
and 702.... A holding to the contrary would simply
encourage the Government to offer all kinds of
specialized opinions without pausing first properly
to establish the required qualifications of their
witnesses." Id at 1246.
**22 Importantly, the Figueroa-Lopez court then
identified portions of another agent's testimony that
were properly admissible as lay witness testimony.

Noting that one of the agents had testified regarding
the "suspicious" nature of the defendant's conduct,
the court expressly held that opinions regarding
whether a person is acting suspiciously are
"common enough" to be admissible as lay witness
testimony. Id. at 1246. The decision in
Figueroa-Lopez therefore provides an example of
how the rules do "not distinguish between expert
and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay
testimony." Fed R. Evid. 701 advisory committee
notes. Thus, it is "[c]ertainly ... possible for the
same witness to provide both lay and expert
testimony in a single case." Id.
**23 The question before us in the present case,
then, is whether Chief Adair's testimony regarding
the
significance
of
the
quantity
of
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's pants
was the type of testimony that was necessarily based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. We hold that it was.
[3] **24 It is well settled that witnesses can be
qualified as experts not only on the basis of formal
educational training, but also on the basis of their
own personal or vocational experiences. See, e.g.,
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1 15, 1 P.3d 546;
mOORandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah
1993). In State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah
1986), for example, our supreme court held that a
witness's prior experience as a "user and seller" of
drugs qualified him to testify as an expert on "the
current drug culture." Id at 420. Similarly, in
Randle, our supreme court held that a witness could
be qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction
by virtue of his practical experience dealing with
such matters. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337.
**25 There have been no Utah cases that have
specifically addressed the question of whether
knowledge of the significance of a particular
quantity of an illegal drug should be regarded as
specialized knowledge about which a witness must
be qualified as an expert in order to testify. The
Tenth Circuit, however, has specifically addressed
this question and has definitively concluded that
such knowledge should be regarded as specialized
knowledge. In United States v. McDonald, 933
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F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.1991), the court noted that the
"[defendant possessed 6.7 grams of rock cocaine."
Id. at 1522. The court then concluded that "[a]
person possessing no knowledge of the drug world
would find the importance of this fact impossible to
understand. The average juror would not know
whether this quantity is a mere trace, or sufficient to
pollute 1000 people." Id. In United States v.
Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir.1994), the court
similarly held that "a veteran police officer"
testified from "specialized knowledge" when he
testified that a particular amount of cocaine would
likely be "for distribution and not for personal use."
Id. at 1338.
[4] **26 We agree with the Tenth Circuit's
assessment of this question. In our view,
knowledge regarding the significance of a particular
quantity of drug is "beyond the realm of common
experience" for the common juror, Randolph, 590
F.2d at 846, and is accordingly the type of
testimony that a witness could offer only if first
qualified as an expert. [FN5] Applied to the present
case, Chief Adair was clearly permitted to offer lay
witness testimony regarding the events leading up to
Rothlisberger's arrest. Chief Adair was further
permitted to offer testimony that was rationally
derived from his perceptions of the events on that
day. Such testimony could also have included any
opinions relating to any matters arising therefrom
that would have been within the common
experience of a common citizen. The State was not
permitted, however, to elicit any opinions or
conclusions from Chief Adair that were necessarily
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, without first seeking to qualify him as
an expert witness under *1201 rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. The testimony from Chief Adahbased on his specialized knowledge was therefore
permissible only upon compliance with all
applicable laws and rules relating to expert
testimony. Because the trial court allowed Chief
Adair to testify as a lay witness regarding these
matters, we thus necessarily conclude that the court
abused its discretion. [FN6]
FN5. The State argues that, under the
terms of our decision in Provo City Corp.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI

v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
, we should reach a different result on this
question. In Spotts, we held that a lay
witness was permitted to testify regarding
the identity of a particular drug. See id. at
442-43. In reaching that conclusion, we
"emphasize[d] that [the] case involved not
only the substance's smell, but also
simultaneous observation of the smoke
exiting defendant's mouth and prior
observation of the act of taking 'hits' from
a 'joint.' " Id. at 443. In our view, the result
in Spotts was necessarily predicated on our
recognition of the degree to which certain
drugs have permeated our society.
Because of this proliferation, knowledge of
the appearance, smell, and resultant
physical effects of certain substances can
unfortunately be considered common
knowledge in our society. Our decision in
Spotts implicitly acknowledged this sad
state of affairs, and thus appropriately held
that opinions regarding the identity of
particular substances can be the subject of
lay testimony. The question before us
here, however, does not deal with the
common juror's ability to merely identify a
particular substance, but instead deals with
the common juror's ability to identify
whether a particular quantity of an illegal
substance is so large that it would likely be
used for future sale. By definition, the
only persons having such knowledge
would be those who are either actually
involved in the sale of illegal substances,
or those who are involved in law
enforcement's efforts to curb such sales.
Either way, this knowledge must be
regarded as specialized, and testimony that
is based on that knowledge would
therefore appropriately be characterized as
expert testimony.
Notably, a similar result was emphasized
by the federal rules advisory committee.
As noted in the advisory committee notes
to Federal Rule of Evidence 701,
testimony
that a substance appeared to be a narcotic
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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.... is not based on specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702, but rather is
based upon a layperson's personal
knowledge. If, however, that witness were
to describe how a narcotic was
manufactured, or to describe the intricate
workings of a narcotic distribution
network, then the witness would have to
qualify as an expert under Rule 702.
Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note.
FN6. After the conclusion of the trial, the
trial court was asked to reconsider its prior
ruling regarding the nature of Chief Adair's
testimony. In this post-trial ruling, the
court held that Chief Adair's testimony
"actually turned out to be neither expert
testimony or lay opinion testimony, but
merely testimony about Adair's actual
experiences."
In
support
of
that
conclusion, the court noted that Chief
Adair had not actually offered a direct
opinion as to whether the quantity of
methamphetamine that was found in
Rothlisberger's pants was a saleable
quantity, but that Chief Adair had instead
simply testified in general terms regarding
the significance of such quantities in his
past experiences. The State thus argues
that we should alternatively affirm the
rulings below on the basis of this post-trial
ruling. We disagree.
The trial court may have been technically
correct in noting that Chief Adair did not
offer a direct opinion as to whether
Rothlisberger had the intent to distribute
illegal drugs. As noted by the trial court, it
does appear that the questions relating to
the significance of various quantities of
illegal drugs were framed with reference to
Chief Adair's past experiences, and that
Chief Adair was never directly asked how
the quantity of methamphetamine that was
found in Rothlisberger's possession
comported with those prior experiences.
The State's failure to elicit such direct,
case-specific opinion testimony does not
mean, however, that Chief Adair's

testimony should not still be regarded as
expert testimony. Rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence specifically states that
an expert who testified "by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise" (Emphasis added.)
Under its express terms, the rule therefore
contemplates that non-opinion testimony
can still be qualified as expert testimony if
it is based on specialized knowledge or
experience. One example of non-opinion
expert testimony is then specifically
referred to in rule 703 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, which states that expert
testimony may be admitted in the form of
"an opinion or inference." We think it
plain that, in the present circumstances,
Chief Adair's testimony was certainly
intended to create the inference that the
thirty-two grams of methamphetamine
found in Rothlisberger's pants were of
such a large quantity that an intent to
distribute could be inferred. Cf. State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985)
(noting that the quantity of an illegal
substance can be used as evidence of an
intent to distribute); State v. Anderton,
668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1983) (same).
As such, the trial court erred in its
conclusion that Chief Adair's failure to
offer a direct opinion as to the meaning of
this particular evidence rendered his
testimony
admissible
as
non-expert
testimony.
**27 Having concluded that the trial court abused
its discretion in characterizing Chief Adair's
testimony as lay witness testimony, we can readily
conclude that the State was required to comply with
the notice requirements for expert witnesses
contained in Utah Code Annotated section 77-17-13
(2003). Under section 77-17-13(l)(a), the State was
required to provide Rothlisberger with thirty-days
notice that it intended to offer Chief Adair as an
expert witness; section 77-17-13(l)(b) specifically
requires that notice to include
the name and address of [Chief Adair], [Chief
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Adair]'s curriculum vitae, and one of the
following:
(i) a copy of [Chief Adair]'s report, if one exists;
or
(ii) a written explanation of [Chief Adair]'s
proposed testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet
the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to
cooperatively consult with the opposing party on
reasonable notice.
**28 The State argues that, even if we conclude
that Chief Adair's testimony constituted expert
testimony, compliance with section 77-17-13 was
still not required for two reasons. First, the State
argues that Rothlisberger's failure to request a
continuance acted as a waiver of his right to notice.
Second, the State argues that Rothlisberger was
given notice of the proposed testimony by virtue of
the similar testimony that was offered by Officer
Eberling at the preliminary hearing. We disagree.
[5][6] **29 It is generally true that, when a party
is confronted with surprise expert testimony at trial,
a failure to request a continuance acts as a waiver of
the right to challenge the admission of that
testimony. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,1
37, 52 P.3d 451 ("When the prosecution introduces
unexpected testimony, a defendant 'essentially
*1202 waives his right to later claim error' if the
defendant fails to request a continuance or seek
other appropriate relief under Rule 16(g) [of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." (Quoting
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Larson, 775 P.2d
415, 418 (Utah 1989)).)). In contrast to the waiver
cases cited by the State, however, the situation
before us is not one in which the defendant failed to
request a continuance upon being presented with
surprise expert testimony. Rather, this is a situation
in which, after receiving the appropriate objection
from the defendant, the trial court expressly
determined that the challenged testimony was not
expert testimony, but that it was instead admissible
as lay witness testimony. As discussed above, we
have determined that that ruling was in error. As a
result of the trial court's ruling, however, the
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI

mandatory continuance provisions of section
77-17-13(4)(a) would have necessarily been
deemed inapplicable, insofar as there was no
court-recognized expert testimony being offered. In
essence, the trial court's ruling that the testimony
was lay witness testimony rendered any objection
that was predicated on expert-testimony rules futile.
Under our law, parties are not required to make
futile objections in order to preserve a future claim.
See Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286,flf 13,
16, 76 P.3d 1170. Thus, because the trial court first
erred by concluding that the challenged testimony
was admissible as lay witness testimony, we cannot
say that Rothlisberger waived his right to
challenge the admission of that testimony by then
failing to request a continuance under section
77-17-13(4)(a).
[7] **30 Next, section 77-17-13(5)(a) provides
that "testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing
... constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed
trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to
by the expert at the preliminary hearing." We
disagree with the State's suggestion, however, that
the testimony of Officer Eberling at the preliminary
hearing provided Rothlisberger with notice of the
similar testimony that was ultimately offered by
Chief Adair at trial. Under the terms of section
77-17-13(l)(b), a party who is seeking to offer
expert testimony must first provide the other party
with a copy of the expert's name, address, and
curriculum vitae. This clearly contemplates that the
opposing party will have the opportunity to prepare
for that expert's testimony in a witness-specific
fashion. See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021,
1023 (Utah 1994) (holding that one of the
"significant purposes" of pretrial witness disclosure
rules is to provide the opposing party with the
opportunity to "investigate] the witnesses]
testimony"
and
"preparje]
an
effective
cross-examination"). In State v. Tolano, 2001 UT
App 37, 19 P.3d 400, we held that the notice
provision of section 77-17-13(5)(a) is only satisfied
where a witness personally testifies at the
preliminary hearing; otherwise, the opposing party
would not have the time to "prepare to meet [the]
adverse expert testimony." Id. at f 18 (quotations
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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and citation omitted).
[8] **31 Here, Officer Eberling's testimony at the
preliminary hearing did not provide Rothlisberger
with the proper opportunity to prepare for Chief
Adair's expert testimony. Though the testimonies of
the two officers might ultimately have been similar
in content, it is nevertheless clear that the State's
failure to provide notice of Chief Adair's potential
expert testimony at trial deprived Rothlisberger of
the notice that he would need to prepare a
witness-specific response to that testimony. Thus,
because Chief Adair failed to testify as an expert at
the preliminary hearing, the State's failure to
provide Rothlisberger with notice of his testimony
constituted a violation of section 77-17-13(5)(a).
Inasmuch as that testimony was central to the
Possession with Intent to Distribute charge, we
accordingly reverse Rothlisberger's conviction.
[FN7]
FN7. Rothlisberger also argues (i) that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict; (ii) that the trial court
erred in overruling his objection to various
statements made by the prosecutor in his
closing statement; and (iii) that the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
the alternate reasonable hypotheses of
innocence. Because we have already
determined that a new trial is warranted
with respect to Rothlisberger's conviction
for Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute, we need not
address these arguments with respect to
that charge.
With respect to Rothlisberger's arguments
relating to his conviction for Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia, we conclude that
reversal is not warranted. As noted above,
Rothlisberger admitted to the officers that
the snort tube that was found in the car was
his. Rothlisberger has not contested the
admissibility of that admission before this
court, nor has he argued that the snort tube
does not constitute drug paraphernalia
under Utah Code Annotated section
58-37a-3 (2002). As such, we can readily

conclude that the court did not err in
denying his motion for a directed verdict
on that charge. We can further conclude
that any error that the court might have
made with respect to the rulings regarding
either the prosecutor's closing statements
or the alternate reasonable hypothesis of
innocence
doctrine
was
harmless.
Accordingly, Rothlisberger's conviction
for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia is
affirmed.
*1203 CONCLUSION
**32 We conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion when it allowed Chief Adair to testify as
a lay witness about the significance of various
quantities of methamphetamine. Because the State
failed to give Rothlisberger thirty-days notice of
that testimony as required by Utah Code Annotated
section
77-17-13
(2003),
we
reverse
Rothlisberger's conviction for Possession with
Intent to Distribute and remand for a new trial on
that charge.
**331 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
**34 I DISSENT: RUSSELL
Associate Presiding Judge.

W. BENCH,

95 P.3d 1193, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2004 UT
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Tonya ALTHOFF, Defendant and Appellant.
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Feb. 17,2005.
Seventh District, Monticello Department; The
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.

right to notice of the nature of Adair's testimony and
his background was violated. See id. at 1fl[ 10-27.
Having decided in Rothlisberger, under identical
circumstances, that the trial court's decision was
improper, and that the State failed to comply with
the requirements of Utah Code section 77-17-13
(2003), we are compelled to follow that decision
here. See State v. Simms, 881 P.2d 840, 843 n.7
(Utah 1994) ("Stare decisis requires that a decision
rendered by a court in a particular factual context
govern later decisions by that court arising under
the same or similar facts.").
Accordingly, we reverse Althoffs convictions and
remand this case for a new trial. [FN1]

William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. Delporto, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE, Judge:

FN1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted
the State's petition for certiorari in State v.
Rothlisberger. See 2004 UT App 226, 95
P.3d 1193, cert, granted, 2004 Utah
LEXIS 248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004).
Assuming that the State's dissatisfaction
with the outcome of the instant case
mirrors its position in Rothlisberer, we
encourage it to move for consolidation of
the two cases.

*1 Toyna Althoff appeals her conviction for
possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute, as well as her associated convictions
for possession of drug paraphernalia and various
traffic related crimes. We reverse.

WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge.

Althoff s arrest, conviction, and appeal mirror those
of her companion at the time of her arrest, Thomas
Kevin Rothlisberger. See State v. Rothlisberger,
2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193, cert granted,
2004 Utah LEXIS 248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004).
Moreover, she presents an issue that is identical to
the issue central to our decision in Rothlisberger,
namely, whether the trial court erred in refusing to
recognize that a portion of Chief Adair's testimony
was expert testimony and, if so, whether Althoff s

END OF DOCUMENT

Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 375089 (Utah
App.), 2005 UT App 69

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

